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Foreseeable Trouble: How Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. Offends Fundamental 
Policies of the U.S. Patent System by Making 
Prosecution History Estoppel Depend upon 
Foreseeability 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The degree to which prosecution history estoppel limits the 
doctrine of equivalents has long been the subject of much debate 
among patent owners, competitors, and the courts. In Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,1 the Supreme Court 
attempted to provide guidance on the issue by establishing that 
whenever patent claims are narrowed by amendment, a rebuttable 
presumption arises that prosecution history estoppel bars all 
equivalents.2 However, the Court’s decision may have done more 
harm than good by introducing a foreseeability element into the 
requirements for rebutting the presumption. 
The state of the law prior to Festo was unclear at best. In 1997, 
the Supreme Court held that prosecution history estoppel was a 
flexible, not an absolute, bar to the doctrine of equivalents in patent 
infringement cases, meaning that some, but not all, claims of 
equivalence would be barred.3 In 2000, the Federal Circuit departed 
from the flexible-bar rule by holding that whenever a patentee 
amends claims in order to obtain a patent, prosecution history 
estoppel acts as an absolute bar to the doctrine of equivalents with 
respect to the amended elements.4 The Federal Circuit justified its 
harsh, absolute-bar rule on the grounds that the flexible-bar 




 1. 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002). 
 2. Id. at 1842. 
 3. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997). 
 4. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 574–75 
(Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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provide desired certainty in determining the scope of an amended 
patent claim.5 
The Federal Circuit’s decision was the source of great concern to 
thousands of patentees because it significantly limited the range of 
subject matter against which a patentee could successfully assert a 
claim of infringement by equivalence.6 Patent claims narrowed by 
amendment during patent prosecution—and many claims are—
would be limited to their literal language for all amended elements, 
thereby depriving patentees of protection against competitors’ 
devices falling just outside the literal language. Patentees who 
amended their claims with a flexible-bar rule in mind were 
understandably concerned that the Federal Circuit’s absolute bar 
devalued their already-issued patents by effectively granting a much 
narrower monopoly. 
Concerned patent holders were relieved when, on May 28, 2002, 
the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision and re-
instituted a flexible-bar rule.7 In re-instituting a flexible-bar rule, the 
Supreme Court held that a presumption exists that prosecution 
history estoppel bars all equivalents but that the patent owner may 
rebut the presumption under certain circumstances.8 The difference, 
therefore, between the Supreme Court’s flexible bar and the Federal 
Circuit’s absolute bar lies in the fact that the presumption is 
rebuttable. The problem with the Supreme Court’s decision is that it 
sets forth contradictory standards for how rebuttal is to be 
accomplished and it creates incentives that undercut the goals of the 
patent system. 
This Note will discuss the tension between the doctrine of 
equivalents and prosecution history estoppel and how the Supreme 
Court attempted to resolve that tension in its Festo decision. Part II 
will briefly explain several basic patent law principles and outline the 
state of the law in 1997 as set forth in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. 
Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,9 against which the Federal Circuit’s 
 
 5. Id. at 575, 577. 
 6. See, e.g., Margaret Quan, Ruling Muddles Scope of Technology Patents, EE TIMES, 
Feb. 9, 2001, at http://www.eetimes.com/story/OEG20010209S0018 (last visited Feb. 14, 
2003). The Supreme Court referred to the “countless existing patent holders” who would 
have their “legitimate expectations” destroyed. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1841. 
 7. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1840. 
 8. Id. at 1842. 
 9. 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
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decision and its subsequent vacation by the Supreme Court were set. 
Part III will follow with a description of the facts of the Festo case 
and a brief synopsis of the holdings of the Federal Circuit and the 
Supreme Court. Part IV will analyze the Supreme Court’s Festo 
decision vacating the Federal Circuit and assert that while the Court 
correctly reaffirmed estoppel as a flexible, not an absolute, bar to the 
doctrine of equivalents, the Court undercut some of the most basic 
policies of the patent system by introducing foreseeability as a 
component of the flexible bar. Part V will offer a brief conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Dual Purposes of Patent Claims 
The question of how far a patent’s monopoly extends has always 
been a difficult one. In order to obtain a patent on an invention, a 
patentee is required to particularly point out and distinctly claim the 
subject matter he regards as his invention.10 Claims serve at least two 
important functions: (1) claims offer protection to the patent holder 
by delineating the bounds of the property right granted, thereby 
defining the subject matter the patentee can legally exclude 
competitors from making and selling;11 and (2) claims provide notice 
to the public of what property the patent owner does not own, 
thereby enabling the public to know what subject matter is freely 
available.12 There is tension between the protection and notice 
functions of claims. These two functions can be represented by a 
spectrum, or sliding-scale, one end of which represents the 
protection function and the other end the notice function. Every 
point along the spectrum represents a possible interpretation of the 
language in a patent claim. Because the spectrum is a sliding scale, it 
is impossible to maximize both protection and notice at the same 
time, and either extreme is probably undesirable. 
At the protection end of the spectrum, claims are interpreted 
broadly to include more than what the literal language encompasses. 
 
 10. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
 11. Id. § 154(a) (“Every patent shall . . . grant to the patentee . . . the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States or importing the invention into the United States.”). 
 12. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1837 (Claims are what allow a patent holder to “know what he 
owns, and the public [to] know what he does not.”). 
CAL-FIN 2/15/2003  2:49 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
312 
As a result, greater protection is afforded a patent holder because he 
is not limited in his assertions of infringement to those competitors 
who market devices literally encompassed in the language of the 
claims. The obvious disadvantage at the protection end of the 
spectrum is the fact that the public cannot tell what infringes a 
patent and what does not. The result is a stifling of the economy: 
competitors decline to market legitimate devices for fear of being 
sued for patent infringement. 
At the notice end of the spectrum, claims are interpreted literally. 
This enables claims to provide maximum notice to the public of what 
subject matter is covered by the patent and what subject matter is 
freely available to the public.13 A patent holder can easily ascertain 
exactly how much protection his patent affords him and, 
consequently, his patent’s value. His competitors can know with 
certainty whether their own devices constitute allowable alternatives 
to the patented invention or whether they infringe. Such certainty 
for patentees and the public is desirable, but, as the Supreme Court 
has noted, it comes at a price: “If patents were always interpreted by 
their literal terms, their value would be greatly diminished.”14 For 
example, if a patent claim recited “four legs” and “a round seat,” a 
competitor’s product having four legs and an oval seat would not 
literally infringe the patent. Literal infringement is generally easy for 
a competitor to avoid because merely insubstantial differences 
between the accused product and the claimed invention are sufficient 
to avoid literal infringement. Such instances can be particularly 
frustrating to patent owners. 
B. The Doctrine of Equivalents 
In response to situations in which competitors attempt to avoid 
literal infringement by making insubstantial changes, courts have 
created the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents 
protects a patent holder “against efforts of copyists to evade liability 
for infringement by making only insubstantial changes to a patented 




 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 1835. 
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literal terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the claims 
described.”16 
Under the doctrine of equivalents, even if a competitor’s product 
does not literally infringe, it can still infringe as an equivalent if it 
differs from the claimed invention in merely insubstantial ways. For 
example, suppose again that a patent claim recited “four legs” and “a 
round seat.” A competitor’s product having four legs and an oval 
seat would not literally infringe the patent. However, it could still 
infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if a court held that the 
oval seat was equivalent to a round seat.17 The doctrine of 
equivalents allows a patent holder to exclude competitors not only 
from the subject matter literally defined by the claims but also from 
subject matter constituting an equivalent to the literal subject matter. 
The difficulty with the doctrine of equivalents is knowing where 
to draw the line between what constitutes an infringing equivalent 
and what does not. The Supreme Court has noted: 
[B]y extending protection beyond the literal terms in a patent the 
doctrine of equivalents can create substantial uncertainty about 
where the patent monopoly ends. If the range of equivalents is 
unclear, competitors may be unable to determine what is a 
permitted alternative to a patented invention and what is an 
infringing equivalent.18 
To illustrate, if a patent claim recites “a round seat,” competitors 
can be certain that if their own devices have round seats, literal 
infringement will be found. But there may be some uncertainty as to 
whether an oval seat constitutes an infringing equivalent. There may  
 
 
 16. Id. at 1837. 
 17. To infringe a patent claim, an accused device must contain each element of the 
patent claim, literally or equivalently. Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 
1014 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In our example, the claim element “four legs” is literally present in the 
competitor’s device. The claim element “a round seat” is not literally present in the 
competitor’s device, although the oval seat may qualify as an equivalent. To determine whether 
an oval seat is equivalent to the claimed round seat, a court would employ the “function-way-
result test.” Id. at 1016. To infringe by equivalence, the oval seat must “perform[] 
substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same 
result,” as the claimed round seat. Id. In our example, infringement by equivalence certainly 
seems likely, because a court would probably find that an oval seat performs substantially the 
same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same result, as the 
claimed round seat. 
 18. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1835 (citation omitted). 
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be even more uncertainty as to whether a square, triangular, or other 
shaped seat constitutes an infringing equivalent.19 
The doctrine of equivalents provides greater protection to patent 
holders than does the literal language of the claims. But the 
increased protection afforded by the doctrine of equivalents comes at 
the price of a corresponding increase in the uncertainty of the scope 
of patent claims. As a result, claims provide less notice of what 
subject matter is freely available to the public. 
C. The Doctrine of Prosecution History Estoppel 
The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel helps reduce the 
uncertainty associated with the doctrine of equivalents in certain 
situations. “Competitors may rely on [prosecution history] estoppel 
to ensure that their own devices will not be found to infringe by 
equivalence.”20 Prosecution history estoppel dictates that when a 
patentee narrows a claim in order to obtain a patent, the subject 
matter between the broad claim and the narrower claim is 
surrendered and cannot later constitute an equivalent.21 Therefore, a 
competitor’s product falling within the scope of the original claim 
but outside the scope of the narrowed claim will not infringe, either 
literally or by equivalence. For example, suppose that a patent claim 
originally recited “four legs” and “a seat” and that the claim was 
rejected by the Patent and Trademark Office as being overly broad. 
If the patentee then amends his claim to recite “four legs” and “a 
round seat” in order to obtain the patent, prosecution history 
estoppel will apply. In that case, the difference in subject matter 
between the broad, “seat” claim and the narrower, “round seat” 
claim is surrendered and cannot constitute an equivalent. This is 
significant because if the patentee had originally claimed “a round 
seat,” he could possibly assert a claim of infringement by equivalence 
against a competitor’s device having a square seat. But because he 
narrowed his claim by amendment from “a seat” to “a round seat,” 
prosecution history estoppel says he cannot assert that a square seat is 
equivalent to a round seat. Subject matter encompassed by the broad 
claim and excluded by the narrow claim (like square seats) cannot 
 
 19. The Supreme Court acknowledges that “[i]t is true that the doctrine of equivalents 
renders the scope of patents less certain.” Id. at 1837. 
 20. Id. at 1835. 
 21. Id. at 1838. 
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constitute an equivalent. Therefore, examining a patent’s 
prosecution history is important because whether an accused product 
infringes by equivalence may depend on whether the patent was 
amended. 
D. The State of the Law Prior to the Federal Circuit’s Decision in 2000, 
as Set Forth by the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson22 
Courts have struggled with at least two difficult questions 
regarding prosecution history estoppel and its effect on the doctrine 
of equivalents.23 First, should a claim amended for any reason give 
rise to prosecution history estoppel?24 Second, when an amendment 
does give rise to prosecution history estoppel, are all equivalents 
barred or only some of them? 
In 1997, the Warner-Jenkinson Court attempted to provide 
answers to these questions. The Court held that not all claims 
narrowed by amendment necessarily give rise to prosecution history 
estoppel: “Where the reason for the change was not related to 
avoiding the prior art, the change may introduce a new element, but 
it does not necessarily preclude infringement by equivalents of that 
element.”25 Therefore, “certain reasons for a claim amendment may 
avoid the application of prosecution history estoppel.”26 The Court 
noted, however, that its holding did not mean that “the absence of a 
reason for an amendment may similarly avoid such an estoppel.”27 
The Warner-Jenkinson Court further instructed that when 
amendments are made, there is a presumption that prosecution  
 
 
 22. 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 23. See, e.g., Festo, 122 S. Ct. 1831. The Court stated that the “first question” 
concerned which sort of amendments “give rise to estoppel.” Id. at 1839. The Court 
characterized the “second question” as follows: “Does the estoppel bar the inventor from 
asserting infringement against any equivalent to the narrowed element or might some 
equivalents still infringe?” Id. at 1840. 
 24. Claims may be amended during patent prosecution for a number of reasons. 
Sometimes claims must be amended in order to distinguish from the prior art and meet the 
novelty or non-obviousness requirements of patentability. See 35 U.S.C §§ 102–103 (2000). 
Other times, claims must be amended not to avoid the prior art, but to clarify what the 
patentee means. See id. § 112. Still other times, additional limitations are included by 
amendment even though they are not required. Therefore, some amendments are necessary in 
order to obtain the patent, while others are not. 
 25. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
CAL-FIN 2/15/2003  2:49 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
316 
history estoppel bars application of the doctrine of equivalents but 
that the patentee has the opportunity to overcome the presumption: 
[W]e think the better rule is to place the burden on the patent 
holder to establish the reason for an amendment required during 
patent prosecution. The court then would decide whether that 
reason is sufficient to overcome prosecution history estoppel as a 
bar to application of the doctrine of equivalents to the element 
added by that amendment. Where no explanation is established, 
however, the court should presume that the patent applicant had a 
substantial reason related to patentability for including the limiting 
element added by amendment. In those circumstances, prosecution 
history estoppel would bar the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents as to that element.28 
Under this regime, if a patentee amended her claims during 
prosecution, she would have the opportunity to explain her reasons 
for amending. The court would then decide whether the reasons 
were sufficient to avoid application of prosecution history estoppel. 
In the absence of an explanation, the court would presume the 
amendment was made for patentability reasons (i.e., made in order 
to obtain the patent) and all subject matter surrendered by the 
amendment would be barred from later constituting an infringing 
equivalent. The Warner-Jenkinson Court characterized this rule as a 
“presumption . . . subject to rebuttal.”29 However, the Court 
provided little guidance as to what sort of reasons for amending were 
“sufficient to overcome” the presumption. 
Therefore, the law as set forth by Warner-Jenkinson may be 
summarized by stating that whenever a patentee amends claims 
during prosecution, a rebuttable presumption arises that prosecution 
history estoppel bars application of the doctrine of equivalents as to 
the amended elements. The patentee may rebut the presumption, 
thereby preserving her right to the doctrine of equivalents, by 
establishing “an appropriate reason for [amending].”30 However, 
because the Court failed to define what constitutes an “appropriate 
reason” for amending, Warner-Jenkinson left unclear what the 
standard for rebuttal is. Establishing the standard for rebuttal is  
 
 
 28. Id. (emphasis added). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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precisely what the Supreme Court attempted in its later Festo 
decision. 
III. FESTO CORP. V. SHOKETSU KINZOKU KOGYO KABUSHIKI CO. 
A. The Facts and the Federal Circuit’s Holding 
The Festo Corporation owned two patents relating to an 
improved piston-cylinder assembly, both of which were amended 
during prosecution.31 The application for the first patent was initially 
rejected because “the exact method of operation was unclear and 
some claims were made in an impermissible way.”32 The second 
patent was amended during a reexamination proceeding.33 Both 
patents were amended to include a new limitation: two one-way 
sealing rings.34 The first of the two patents was additionally amended 
to include a second new limitation: that the outer shell of the device 
be magnetizable.35 After Festo’s patents issued, Shoketsu (“SMC”) 
began selling a device similar to the ones disclosed in Festo’s patents, 
but with two notable differences: (1) SMC’s device employed a 
single two-way sealing ring instead of two one-way sealing rings; and 
(2) SMC’s device had a shell made of a nonmagnetizable material.36 
Festo sued SMC for patent infringement. At trial, Festo argued 
that while SMC’s device did not literally infringe Festo’s patent, it 
infringed by equivalence. SMC argued that Festo narrowed its claims 
by amendment to exclude the very subject matter it now sought to 
claim as an equivalent.37 In other words, Festo’s claims as originally 
drafted were broad enough to cover the elements of SMC’s device, 
but were subsequently narrowed by amendment to claim two one-
way sealing rings and a magnetizable sleeve.  The amended claim’s 
language therefore excluded a single two-way sealing ring and a 
nonmagnetizable sleeve from the claimed subject matter. SMC 
argued that prosecution history estoppel barred Festo from trying to 
 
 31. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831, 1835 
(2002). 
 32. Id. at 1835–36. 
 33. Id. at 1836. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
CAL-FIN 2/15/2003  2:49 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
318 
recapture as an equivalent the very subject matter it had surrendered 
by amendment.38 
The Federal Circuit agreed, holding that Festo was barred by 
prosecution history estoppel from asserting that SMC’s device 
infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.39 Several elements of the 
Federal Circuit’s holding were especially controversial. First, the 
court held that amending a patent claim for any reason related to 
patentability would give rise to prosecution history estoppel.40 
Second, and more controversial still, the court held that when 
prosecution history estoppel applies, it acts as an absolute bar to all 
alleged equivalents of the amended claim, effectively meaning that 
once a claim is amended, there can be no such thing as an equivalent 
to the amended elements of that claim.41 The Federal Circuit 
justified its departure from the flexible bar established in Warner-
Jenkinson on the grounds that the flexible bar had proven 
“unworkable” and that an absolute bar was needed to provide 
certainty to the scope of an amended patent claim.42 
B. The Supreme Court’s Holding 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to “address once again the 
relation between two patent law concepts, the doctrine of 
equivalents and the rule of prosecution history estoppel.”43 The 
Court’s opinion may be subdivided into three important sections. 
First, the Court stated its approval of both the doctrine of 
equivalents and the rule of prosecution history estoppel. Second, the 
Court addressed the question of whether all types of amendments 
give rise to prosecution history estoppel. Third, the Court addressed 
the question of whether prosecution history estoppel, once invoked, 





 38. Id. 
 39. Id. (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558 
(Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 40. Id. (citing Festo, 234 F.3d at 566). 
 41. Id. (citing Festo, 234 F.3d at 574–75). 
 42. Festo, 234 F.3d at 575, 577. 
 43. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1835. 
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1. The doctrine of equivalents and the rule of prosecution history estoppel 
are both good law 
The Court began by noting its general approval of both the 
doctrine of equivalents and the rule of prosecution history estoppel, 
stating that “[i]f patents were always interpreted by their literal 
terms, their value would be greatly diminished. . . . The scope of a 
patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all 
equivalents to the claims described.”44 Further, 
“[p]rosecution history estoppel . . . precludes a patentee from 
regaining, through litigation, coverage of subject matter 
relinquished during prosecution of the application for the patent.” 
Were it otherwise, the inventor might avoid the [Patent and 
Trademark Office’s] gatekeeping role and seek to recapture in an 
infringement action the very subject matter surrendered as a 
condition of receiving the patent.45 
Therefore, according to the Supreme Court, both “the doctrine 
of equivalents and the rule of prosecution history estoppel are settled 
law.”46 However, there is tension between the two doctrines: the 
doctrine of equivalents broadens the scope of protection afforded 
patent holders beyond that provided by the literal claim language, 
while the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel acts to contract 
the scope of protection back towards the literal claim language. The 
difficult questions the Court was required to address in Festo 
involved the interplay between the two competing doctrines—
specifically, when and how they affect each other. 
The Supreme Court’s Festo decision was more instructive than 
the Court’s prior decision in Warner-Jenkinson because in Festo the 
Court cleanly separated the amorphous issues surrounding the 
relationship between estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents into 
two questions: When does claim amendment give rise to prosecution 
history estoppel?  And, when prosecution history estoppel does arise, 
does it bar all equivalents to the amended element, or only some of 
them? The Festo Court addressed each of the two questions in turn. 
 
 44. Id. at 1837. 
 45. Id. at 1839 (quoting Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 
1571, 1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 46. Id. at 1841. 
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2. When prosecution history estoppel arises 
The Court held simply that “[e]stoppel arises when an 
amendment is made to secure the patent and the amendment 
narrows the patent’s scope.”47 The Court stated that the inquiry 
should not focus on the applicant’s purpose for amending, but 
should focus rather on the impact the amendment has on the subject 
matter—i.e., whether or not the subject matter is in fact narrowed.48 
Amendments that do not narrow the scope of the claimed subject 
matter do not give rise to prosecution history estoppel.49 Therefore, 
the threshold question for determining whether prosecution history 
estoppel applies is, “does the amendment narrow the claim?” not 
“what was the purpose of the amendment?” 
3. Prosecution history estoppel constitutes a flexible bar to alleged 
equivalents 
The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s holding that 
when prosecution history estoppel applies, it stands as an absolute 
bar to all equivalents. Instead, the Court held that when prosecution 
history estoppel applies, a presumption is raised: when a patentee 
narrows a claim by amendment, it is presumed that “the patentee 
surrendered all subject matter between the broader and the narrower 
language.”50 However, the patentee may rebut the presumption.51 
This is the critical difference between the Supreme Court’s holding 
and that of the Federal Circuit. The opportunity to rebut is the 
reason estoppel constitutes a flexible, not an absolute, bar to the 
doctrine of equivalents. 
The critical inquiry focuses on what must be done to rebut the 
presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars all equivalents to 
the amended claim. In other words, how does a patent holder rebut 
the presumption? Practically speaking, the answer to this question is 
the most important part of the Supreme Court’s Festo decision, as 
well as that which distinguishes Festo from Warner-Jenkinson. 
 
 
 47. Id. at 1840 (emphasis added). 
 48. See id. at 1840–41. 
 49. The Court stated that “[if an] amendment is truly cosmetic, then it would not 
narrow the patent’s scope or raise an estoppel.” Id. at 1840 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. at 1842 (emphasis added) 
 51. Id. 
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The Court stated that to rebut the presumption that estoppel 
bars all equivalents, the patentee “must show that at the time of the 
amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected 
to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the 
alleged equivalent.”52 Had the Court stopped there, it might have 
avoided considerable confusion. But the Court went on to state that 
rebuttal could be accomplished by showing that “[t]he equivalent 
[was] unforeseeable at the time of the application.”53 It appears that 
the test the Court is aiming at with this language is one of 
foreseeability: a patentee who amends his claims can rebut the 
presumption that estoppel bars all equivalents by showing that the 
alleged equivalent was unforeseeable. However, the Court was 
unclear about whether foreseeability is to be determined “at the time 
of the amendment,” or “at the time of the application.” This is 
significant because several years can pass between the time of 
application and the time of amendment, and with rapidly-changing 
technology, that which is completely unforeseeable today may be 
easily foreseen tomorrow. Moreover, if foreseeability really is the test, 
additional complications arise because a foreseeability test creates 
incentives running counter to the main goals of the patent system. 
These incentives will be discussed in further detail in Part IV of this 
Note. 
In summary, the rules of law handed down by the Supreme 
Court in its 2002 Festo decision may be stated thus: whenever a 
patent claim is narrowed by amendment to secure the patent, 
prosecution history estoppel applies, regardless of why the claim was 
amended.54 When prosecution history estoppel applies, it is 
presumed to bar all equivalents to the amended claim.55 However, 
the patentee can rebut the presumption by showing that the alleged 
equivalent was unforeseeable to one skilled in the art.56 It is unclear 
at which point in time foreseeability is to be determined. 
 
 52. Id. (emphasis added). 
 53. Id. (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. at 1840. 
 55. Id. at 1842. 
 56. Id. 
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IV. ANALYSIS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT’S FLEXIBLE BAR WAS 
GOOD POLICY UNTIL THE INTRODUCTION OF  
A FORESEEABILITY ELEMENT 
The analysis section of this Note consists of three parts. Part A 
discusses an initial policy reason supporting the Supreme Court’s 
flexible-bar rule: thousands of patents currently in force were drafted 
and issued with a flexible bar in mind, and instituting an absolute bar 
now would upset the settled expectations of the inventing 
community. Part B discusses the shortcomings of language as a 
second independent policy reason supporting estoppel as a flexible, 
not an absolute, bar to the doctrine of equivalents. Part C agrees 
with the Court’s holding that estoppel ought to act as a rebuttable 
presumption barring equivalents but objects to the Court’s 
introduction of foreseeability into the standard for rebuttal. 
A. Changing the Rules Affecting the Scope of Patents Now Would 
Upset the Settled Expectations of the Inventing Community 
The Supreme Court has warned that courts must use caution 
when they adopt “changes that disrupt the settled expectations of 
the inventing community.”57 This caution is especially necessary in 
dealing with prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of 
equivalents because both “are settled law.”58 Changing the rules that 
affect the scope of protection afforded by patents risks “destroying 
the legitimate expectations of inventors in their property.”59 
Patents are prosecuted with the relevant case law in mind.60 Both 
applicants and examiners rely on case law throughout the 
prosecution process. Applicants choose their claim language in light 
of case law and examiners issue notices of acceptance and rejection 
with the case law in mind. For example, suppose that a patent claim 
recites “four legs” and “a seat” and that the examiner initially rejects 
the claim. At this point the applicant must decide whether to amend 
his claim or leave it as it is and appeal the rejection. Further suppose 
the applicant knows that the Supreme Court has recently held that 
prosecution history estoppel acts as a flexible, not absolute, bar to 
 
 57. See id. at 1841. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. 
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equivalents. Knowing of the flexible bar, the applicant decides to 
amend his claim to recite “four legs” and “a round wooden seat,” 
and the patent issues. Soon after, a competitor begins selling devices 
having four legs and round seats comprised of a previously-unknown 
fiberglass material. In this situation, the patent owner “had no 
reason to believe [he was] conceding all equivalents” when he 
amended his claim, because of the controlling case law.61 As a result, 
the patent owner, thinking fiberglass equivalent to wood, brings suit 
against the competitor for infringement by equivalence. Now 
suppose that while the patent owner is in the initial stages of 
discovery, the Supreme Court adopts an absolute bar such that once 
a claim is amended, estoppel bars all claims of equivalence. The 
patent owner now would have no remedy against his competitor. He 
cannot now appeal the initial rejection occurring during prosecution, 
nor can he successfully assert infringement. This is just the sort of 
situation the Festo Court had in mind when it said that if the 
inventor had known the flexible bar would be replaced by an 
absolute bar, he “might have appealed the rejection instead. There is 
no justification for applying a new and more robust estoppel to those 
who relied on prior doctrine.”62 
Adopting an absolute bar and applying it to patents currently in 
force would “disrupt[] the expectations of countless existing patent 
holders.”63 However, there is another option that the Supreme 
Court did not expressly consider in its Festo decision. The Court 
could have adopted an absolute bar which would only apply to 
patents yet to be prosecuted. This would eliminate the unfairness 
and the disruption of settled expectations the Court sought to avoid. 
At the same time, such a holding would also have all the benefits of 
certainty and judicial economy that are normally associated with a 
“bright-line rule.”64 However, an absolute bar, even if applied 
prospectively only, should still be avoided because it cuts against the 
policy upon which the doctrine of equivalents is based in the first 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. Justice Ginsburg made similar comments in her concurring opinion in Warner-
Jenkinson when she said, “The [absolute bar], if applied woodenly, might in some instances 
unfairly discount the expectations of a patentee who had no notice at the time of patent 
prosecution that such [an absolute bar] would apply.” Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis 
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 63. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1841 (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. 
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place: that language is a poor fit for invention and can never perfectly 
capture the essence of an invention.65 If the doctrine of equivalents is 
still good law—and the Supreme Court has reaffirmed time and  
again that it is66—its very existence seems to preclude a rule that 
makes prosecution history estoppel an absolute bar to equivalents. 
B. The Policy Behind the Doctrine of Equivalents Supports Application 
to Amended Claims as Well as to Original Claims 
The Federal Circuit’s Festo decision held that “prosecution 
history estoppel acts as a complete bar to the application of the 
doctrine of equivalents when an amendment has narrowed the scope 
of a claim.”67 According to the Federal Circuit, an original claim is 
entitled to some range of equivalents, but once amended, the claim 
must be interpreted to include only subject matter falling within the 
literal language of the claim. The Federal Circuit’s holding results in 
an interesting paradox: prior to amendment, the court will recognize 
that an inventor cannot perfectly describe his invention with 
language, but if he amends his claims, he is then treated as if he were 
able to perfectly describe his invention. The Supreme Court’s Festo 
decision recognized this inconsistency when it stated: 
By amending the application, the inventor is deemed to concede 
that the patent does not extend as far as the original claim. It does 
not follow, however, that the amended claim becomes so perfect in 
its description that no one could devise an equivalent. After 
amendment, as before, language remains an imperfect fit for 
invention. The narrowing amendment may demonstrate what the 
claim is not; but it may still fail to capture precisely what the claim 
is. . . . As a result, there is no more reason for holding the patentee 
to the literal terms of an amended claim than there is for abolishing 
 
 65. Precisely because language cannot perfectly describe an invention, the law grants to 
patent holders protection corresponding to the literal language of the claims plus a buffer zone 
of protection encompassing equivalents to the literal subject matter. It is true that the doctrine 
of equivalents introduces uncertainty into the scope of a patent’s protection, but the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that “[e]ach time the Court has considered the doctrine, it has 
acknowledged this uncertainty as the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for 
innovation.” Id. at 1837–38. 
 66. The Festo Court stated that “equivalents remain a firmly entrenched part of the 
settled rights protected by the patent. . . . [I]f the doctrine is to be discarded, it is Congress 
and not the Court that should do so.” Id. at 1838 (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28). 
 67. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 574 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000). 
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the doctrine of equivalents altogether and holding every patentee 
to the literal terms of the patent.68 
Whether or not the doctrine of equivalents should be abolished 
altogether is another interesting question, but the Supreme Court 
“has acknowledged [the uncertainty the doctrine of equivalents 
produces] as the price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for 
innovation, and it has affirmed the doctrine [of equivalents] over 
dissents that urged a more certain rule.”69 The Court has further 
stated that “if the doctrine is to be discarded, it is Congress and not 
the Court that should do so. . . . ‘Congress can legislate the doctrine 
of equivalents out of existence any time it chooses.’”70 
The Supreme Court’s argument against the absolute bar imposed 
by the Federal Circuit is mainly one of consistency. Legislating the 
doctrine of equivalents out of existence and holding inventors to the 
literal language of their claims, whether or not amended, may be bad 
policy, but at least it is internally consistent policy. So is allowing 
application of the doctrine of equivalents to original and amended 
claims (because in both cases inventors cannot perfectly describe 
their inventions using language). However, it is inconsistent to hold, 
as the Federal Circuit did, that original claims are entitled to the 
doctrine of equivalents while amended claims are not. In other 
words, original and amended claims should both be entitled to 
equivalents, or else neither should. The doctrine of equivalents exists 
in the first place because language is an imperfect means of 
describing an invention, and that problem exists whether or not a 
claim is amended. Therefore, the same justification for the existence 
of the doctrine of equivalents in the first place also justifies its 
application to amended claims. 
 
 
 68. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1840–41. 
 69. Id. at 1838. 
 70. Id. (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28). Justice Black advanced a persuasive 
argument against the existence of the doctrine of equivalents when he said that, under the 
doctrine, a competitor “cannot rely on what the language of a patent claims. He must be able, 
at the peril of heavy infringement damages, to forecast how far a court relatively unversed in a 
particular technological field will expand the claim’s language. . . .” Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. 
v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 617 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting). The Warner-
Jenkinson Court voiced a similar concern that the doctrine of equivalents “has taken on a life of 
its own, unbounded by the patent claims. There can be no denying that the doctrine of 
equivalents, when applied broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of 
the statutory claiming requirement.” Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28–29. 
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Because of language’s imperfection, the Supreme Court had little 
difficulty in reaching its decision that estoppel should constitute a 
flexible, not absolute, bar to equivalents.71 Similarly, the Court easily 
reached its holding that claim amendment creates a rebuttable 
presumption that estoppel bars all equivalents.72 However, the real 
difficulties arose when the Court established that the standard for 
rebuttal hinges on foreseeability. 
C. The Supreme Court’s Standard of Foreseeability Is Ambiguous and 
Creates Incentives that Run Counter to the  
Goals of the Patent System 
The Festo Court held that in order for a patent holder to rebut 
the presumption that estoppel bars all equivalents, she “must show 
that at the time of the amendment one skilled in the art could not 
reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have 
literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.”73 The Court also 
stated that a patent holder can rebut the presumption by showing 
the alleged equivalent was “unforeseeable at the time of the 
application.”74 As stated previously in this Note, the Court was 
unclear about whether foreseeability is to be determined at the time 
of amendment or at the time of the application. This ambiguity is 
problematic because several years can pass between the “time of the 
application” and the “time of the amendment,” and during this time 
the scope of the subject matter considered “foreseeable” may change 
greatly. This ambiguity will almost certainly require the Supreme 
Court to address the issue again to clarify the point in time at which 
foreseeability is to be determined. 
Additionally, because foreseeability is a mixed question of law 
and fact,75 basing the standard of rebuttal upon foreseeability would 
raise new factual issues, making infringement cases less likely to be 
resolved on summary judgment.76 Courts would often need to resort 
 
 71. Festo, 122 S. Ct. at 1841 (“[T]here is no more reason for holding the patentee to 
the literal terms of an amended claim than there is for abolishing the doctrine of equivalents 
altogether and holding every patentee to the literal terms of the patent.”). 
 72. Id. at 1841–42. 
 73. Id. at 1842 (emphasis added). 
 74. Id. (emphasis added). 
 75. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1063 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (Lourie, J., concurring) (“Foreseeability is not solely a question of law.”). 
 76. See id. 
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to expert testimony in order to determine what was foreseeable at a 
given point in time.77 As a result, introducing the concept of 
foreseeability seems to complicate, rather than simplify, an 
“already . . . amorphous and vague area of the law.”78 
Perhaps the most serious problem with introducing foreseeability 
into the rebuttal analysis lies in the resulting incentives that are 
created. Judge Lourie of the Federal Circuit notes that “the concept 
of foreseeability seems akin to obviousness,”79 and he advances a 
persuasive argument based on that assumption of similarity. An 
example serves to illustrate: Assume that foreseeability and 
obviousness are similar80 and that for an amended claim, 
foreseeability precludes equivalence consistent with the Festo Court’s 
holding. Suppose again that a patent claim recites “four legs” and “a 
seat” originally, and is initially rejected. Suppose the applicant then 
amends his claim to recite “four legs” and “a fiberglass seat,” and 
that he is unworried because fiberglass happens to be the only 
known material suited to the device’s purpose anyway. Further 
suppose that his patent issues and that some time later a competitor 
 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. One of the requirements of patentability is that the thing sought to be patented 
be non-obvious in light of the prior art. A patent will not be granted “if the differences 
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000) 
(emphasis added). One of the most influential Supreme Court decisions interpreting § 103 was 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), in which the Court said obviousness lent itself 
to “several basic factual inquiries. Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be 
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and 
the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.” Id. at 17. For example, suppose an 
inventor sought a patent on a new type of bicycle frame. The relevant inquiries would be (1) 
what is currently known in the bicycle frame world, (2) what are the differences between the 
new frame and what is already known, and (3) what level of skill does the hypothetical person 
of “ordinary skill” in the world of bicycle frames possess. If the new bicycle frame represents 
such a low level of innovation over what is already known that it would have been obvious to 
one of ordinary skill in the world of bike frames (probably a bicycle/mechanical engineer), 
then the new frame does not merit a patent. For more in-depth treatment of obviousness, see 
generally 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 5.01–5.06 (2002). 
 80. Such an assumption seems reasonable. “Foreseeability” is defined as “[t]he quality 
of being reasonably anticipatable,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (7th ed. 1999), while 
“obviousness” is defined as “[t]he quality or state of being easily apparent to a person with 
ordinary skill in a given art . . . so that the person could reasonably believe . . . the invention 
was to be expected.” Id. at 1105. When given their ordinary meanings, “expecting” and 
“anticipating” seem quite similar. 
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discovers that a new carbon-fiber material is a perfect substitute for 
fiberglass in any application. The competitor begins marketing a 
device exactly like the patented device, except that carbon-fiber is 
substituted for fiberglass. The patentee now desires to sue his 
competitor for infringement by equivalence. 
The facts in the above example serve to illustrate the awkward 
positions from which the respective parties would be forced to argue 
in light of the Supreme Court’s Festo holding. As previously 
discussed, since the amendment narrowed the claim (regardless of 
why the amendment was made), prosecution history estoppel applies 
and raises a rebuttable presumption that there are no equivalents to 
“a fiberglass seat” (the amended claim element). The patent holder 
must rebut the presumption by arguing that the carbon-fiber seat 
was not foreseeable, i.e., not obvious. But if the carbon-fiber seat 
was not foreseeable or obvious, it should be patentable.81 Therefore, 
the patent holder is forced to make the awkward argument that 
while his competitor’s device represents a sufficient level of 
innovation to merit its own patent (because it was not obvious), it 
nevertheless infringes the patent holder’s patent by equivalence 
(because it was not foreseeable).82 It is axiomatic that a device 
meriting its own patent does not infringe any other patents. 
The competitor’s argument under the same facts would be no 
less awkward. In order to escape liability, the competitor must argue 
that his carbon-fiber seat was foreseeable and therefore not an 
equivalent. But if the carbon-fiber seat was foreseeable, then it was 
obvious, and the competitor is forced to argue that his device does 
not infringe by equivalence because it represents such a low level of 
innovation as to be foreseeable and obvious.83 A party accused of 
infringement generally wishes to show that his device represents a 
substantial innovation, not that it was obvious. 
In addition to forcing parties to make counterintuitive 
arguments, basing the standard for rebuttal on foreseeability also 
creates undesirable incentives. One of the goals of the patent system 
is to encourage inventors to publicly disclose their innovations via 
the filing of patents.84 The Festo Court’s foreseeability standard 
 
 81. See 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 82. See Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1063 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. 
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actually discourages the filing of patents in some instances. For 
example, suppose an inventor wishes to market a new device and that 
the device is legitimate but close to the amended claims of an 
existing patent. If the inventor seeks a patent, he must show that his 
device is non-obvious (i.e., not foreseeable) in order to obtain the 
patent.85 But if for some reason the patent is not granted, the 
inventor will be left in a difficult position: if the inventor is sued for 
infringement by equivalence, he will have to reverse direction and 
argue exactly the opposite of what he argued before the Patent 
Office: he will now need to argue that his invention was obvious and 
foreseeable and that it therefore cannot constitute an equivalent. In 
such an instance, the inventor actually has an incentive at the outset 
to forego filing a patent application in order to preserve his ability to 
effectively argue obviousness and foreseeability in infringement 
actions.86 Giving the inventors of legitimate devices an incentive to 
avoid filing a patent runs directly counter to the goal of the patent 
system of encouraging disclosure through the filing of patents. 
In summary, the Court erred by setting forth contradictory times 
at which foreseeability is determined, and it erred at a more critical 
level by adding an element of foreseeability to the rebuttable 
presumption. Doing so forces patentees and competitors to make 
arguments that are counterintuitive to the patent system and also 
creates inappropriate incentives. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court essentially took one step forward and two 
steps back in its Festo decision. The Court stepped forward by 
holding that when a claim is narrowed by amendment, a rebuttable 
presumption arises that prosecution history estoppel bars all 
assertions of equivalence. The rebuttability of the presumption 
makes estoppel a flexible, not an absolute, bar. But the Court took 
two steps backward by holding that successful rebuttal requires a 
showing that the alleged equivalents would have been unforeseeable 
to one skilled in the art. Not only did the Court confuse the rebuttal 
analysis by contradicting itself as to the time at which foreseeability is 
to be determined, but the Court also created incentives that run  
 
 
 85. See 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 86. See Johnson & Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1063 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
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counter to the very incentives the patent system exists to provide in 
the first place. 
Because of the confusion and undesirable incentives created by 
its Festo decision, the Supreme Court will need to address the 
relationship between the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution 
history estoppel again in the future. It is possible that the Court will 
merely clarify the point in time at which foreseeability is to be 
determined. Such a decision would certainly represent an 
improvement from where the Court left things in Festo, but the 
better approach would be to revise the flexible bar to exclude the 
element of foreseeability altogether. Introducing an element of 
foreseeability, or any other element that creates incentives which 
undercut the goals of the patent system, is not the answer. 
Tony Caliendo 
 
